Christopher Aleo
Credit: Christopher Aleo

Italy is once again grappling with an old and stubborn issue: how to deal with its vast backlog of unpaid tax bills, known locally as cartelle esattoriali. For years, successive governments have turned to a familiar tool — tax amnesties and 'settlement' schemes offering discounts to struggling taxpayers. But with more than €1.2 trillion in unpaid tax claims now clogging the system, Rome is considering a new approach: securitisation.

And at the centre of the conversation is Christopher Aleo, a Swiss-Italian banker and founder of the fintech group iSwiss Bank, known for its work in structured finance and cross-border securitisation. Aleo believes Italy's turn toward financial engineering could finally bring discipline and efficiency to a sector plagued by political quick-fixes and administrative inertia.

'Securitisation isn't a loophole or an escape hatch,' says Aleo. 'It's a disciplined, market-based mechanism that allows the state to realise immediate value from credit it would otherwise never collect — and to do so without compromising fairness or legal integrity.'

From Forgiveness to Financial Markets

Italy's traditional approach has centred on rottamazioni — tax pardons that allow debtors to pay off only the principal, waiving penalties and interest. While these programs generate some revenue and offer relief to citizens, they come at a price. Economists warn they erode the culture of voluntary tax compliance and incentivise late payments in the hope of future discounts.

Christopher Aleo, however, proposes a more structured and financially sound alternative. In a securitisation model, the state sells a portfolio of recoverable tax debts to a special purpose vehicle (SPV), which in turn issues bonds backed by expected cash flows from those claims. Investors purchase the securities at a discount, providing the government with immediate liquidity. If collections are successful, investors profit; if not, they absorb the loss.

'You separate the political from the financial,' Aleo explains. 'The state collects funds today and offloads the collection risk to those who are professionally equipped to manage it.'

A Pragmatic Solution — Not A Sellout

Critics in Italy have voiced concerns that selling tax receivables to private investors could feel like 'privatising' public obligations. But Aleo dismisses the idea that securitisation weakens state authority or undermines trust.

'The state still sets the rules, enforces the law, and protects citizens,' he says. 'But when a debt has sat idle for a decade, you need efficiency — and the private sector can often deliver that better.'

He also warns that without reform, Italy will continue to accumulate uncollectible tax claims while repeating costly amnesty cycles.

Aleo points to several international examples — including securitisation efforts in Portugal, Belgium and Germany — that show both the promise and the risks of such strategies. In Portugal, the 'Explorer' deal of the early 2000s raised nearly €1.7 billion, but later suffered reputational setbacks when collections lagged behind projections.

'Those cases teach us to be realistic with assumptions,' says Aleo. 'But they also prove there is a functioning market for public debt portfolios — as long as you're transparent, compliant, and conservative in your modelling.'

The iSwiss Readiness to Act

In what could be seen as a call to action, Aleo has made it clear that iSwiss Bank stands ready to support the Italian government should it move forward with securitising tax debts. His institution, which has experience managing securitisation transactions across Europe, would be prepared to assist in structuring the vehicles, coordinating investor placement, and ensuring that the process meets international financial standards.

'We have the infrastructure, the legal frameworks, and the investor relationships to bring a deal like this to market responsibly,' he says. 'If Italy needs our support, we're here to provide it.'

Looking Ahead

What Aleo envisions is not just a one-off financial manoeuvre, but part of a broader strategy to modernise public finance. He sees securitisation not as a substitute for systemic reform, but as a bridge to it — a way to clean up legacy balances while laying the groundwork for more efficient future tax collection.

'The real victory,' he concludes, 'will be if securitisation helps Italy draw a line under its historical tax inefficiencies and build a smarter, fairer system going forward.'

From the outside, Italy's plan may seem unconventional. But with the right safeguards, and the guidance of financial experts like Aleo, turning uncollected taxes into market assets may be exactly the kind of innovation the country's overburdened system needs.